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In this laboratory experiment sellers simultaneously post prices and choose whether to advertise. 
Buyers then decide whether to buy from a seller whose advertisement they have received, or 
engage in costly sequential search to obtain price quotes from other sellers. In the unique 
symmetric equilibrium, sellers either charge a high unadvertised price or randomize in an 
interval of lower advertised prices. Increases in either search or advertising costs raise 
equilibrium prices, and equilibrium advertising intensity decreases with lower search costs and 
higher advertising costs. Our results are consistent with most of these comparative static 
predictions, and sellers also post lower advertised than unadvertised prices as predicted. In all 
treatments, however, sellers price much lower than the equilibrium interval and earn very low 
profits. Although buyers’ search decisions are approximately optimal, sellers advertise more 
intensely than predicted. Consequently, market outcomes more closely resemble a perfect 
information, Bertrand-like equilibrium than the imperfect information, mixed strategy 
equilibrium that features significant seller market power. 
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If buyers are perfectly informed about seller prices of a homogeneous product, then the 
outcome of Bertrand competition is marginal-cost pricing. Imperfect information about seller 
prices, however, can lead to market power. At the extreme, if buyers must search for prices 
sequentially with strictly positive search costs, then in equilibrium no buyer would search and all 
sellers would charge the monopoly price (Diamond, 1971). But as Robert and Stahl (1993) 
emphasize, sellers have an incentive to advertise lower prices, thereby undermining the 
monopoly equilibrium. They introduce advertising in a sequential costly buyer search model, 
where the differentially-informed buyers yield a market equilibrium that is characterized by price 
dispersion. This price variance gives buyers the incentive to search for lower prices. Non-
dispersed price equilibria do not exist because of a cyclical best response structure for the sellers: 
the best response to a rival charging some price p is to charge a price fractionally below p (as in 
Bertrand competition), but unlike perfect information models there typically exists some lowest 
price  p  for which the best response is not undercutting but is instead charging a high 
unadvertised price and selling only to uninformed buyers. 
The “law of one price” is not an empirical regularity; in fact, even Stigler (1961, pg. 213) 
observed that “dispersion [of prices] is ubiquitous even for homogenous goods.” Economists’ 
interest in price dispersion has been renewed recently based in part on field evidence that it 
persists even as information technologies have reduced search costs. For example, Brynjolfsson 
and Smith (2000) document substantial price dispersion on Internet price comparison sites, and 
Baye, Morgan and Scholten (2004) find large and persistent price dispersion in what appears to 
be essentially homogenous goods markets. But one limitation of the field evidence is that it 
rarely can include truly homogeneous products as typically assumed in theory. Even when the 
items being purchased are identical products produced by the same manufacturer (as Baye et al. 
consider), the retail distribution typically features differences in customer service, reputations, 
and (particularly relevant for Internet retailing) beliefs in delivery reliability. The observed price 
dispersion in the field data might therefore reflect some of these unobserved differences between 
sellers of an identical product. Laboratory methods provide alternative empirical evidence by 
controlling and manipulating these variables that are difficult to measure in the field. 
In this paper we examine laboratory markets that are broadly consistent with assumptions 
typically made in competitive models of costly buyer search and informative price advertising.   2
The experiment is specifically structured by Robert and Stahl’s stylized model in which buyers’ 
information is endogenously determined along with seller prices, advertising and profitability. 
Sellers are not capacity constrained, and buyers demand at most one unit per trading period. In 
the unique symmetric Bayesian equilibrium, sellers either charge a high unadvertised price or 
randomize in an interval of lower advertised prices, and buyers conduct at most one search per 
period. Increases in either search or advertising costs raise equilibrium prices, and equilibrium 
advertising intensity decreases with lower search costs and higher advertising costs. Our results 
are consistent with the pattern from previous posted-price market experiments in that behavior 
deviates from the quantitative theoretical predictions, but broadly conforms to the equilibrium 
comparative statics (Brown-Kruse et al., 1994, Morgan et al. 2006a,b). Sellers in our experiment 
also post lower advertised than unadvertised prices, as predicted. In all treatments, however, 
prices are significantly lower than the equilibrium price interval and sellers earn profits that are a 
fraction (12 to 40 percent) of the equilibrium level. Prices are also not as dispersed as predicted 
by theory. Buyers’ search decisions, although approximately optimal, exhibit a small bias 
towards under-searching. Sellers advertise more intensely than in equilibrium, which results in 
widespread diffusion of information. Consequently, market outcomes more closely resemble a 
perfect information, Bertrand-like equilibrium than the imperfect information, mixed strategy 
equilibrium that features significant seller market power. 
These results with human buyers contrast sharply with our previous study (Cason and 
Datta, 2006), which reports sessions with robot buyers that are pre-programmed to search 
according to an observable equilibrium reservation price strategy. Those sessions with robot 
buyers provide almost uniformly positive support for the theoretical model. The data support all 
of the model’s comparative static predictions; and similar to this study, the only systematic 
deviation from the quantitative predictions is that observed advertising rates exceed the predicted 
rates. The crucial difference is that unlike this study, the observed price levels in robot buyer 
sessions are broadly consistent with the predicted equilibrium price levels. A comparison 
between these two studies indicates that a fundamental difference exists in the behavioral 
equilibrium when the robot buyers’ reservation price search strategies are replaced with human 
buyers. The robot buyers’ expectations and behavior is unaffected by observation of non-
equilibrium prices, while human buyers’ expectations can adjust to low seller prices. Seller 
advertising pushes prices to still lower levels, away from equilibrium, and buyers observe more   3
than one price before purchase 2 to 6 times more frequently than the rate expected by the 
equilibrium analysis. 
We return later to the contrast between sessions with human and robot buyers, and only 
point out here that such dramatic differences in outcomes are not anticipated by earlier research 
that does not feature seller advertising. For example, Cason and Friedman (2003) and Davis and 
Williams (1991) employ both robot and human buyers in different posted offer market 
treatments. These earlier experiments indicate more variable market outcomes in the human 
buyer sessions than in the robot buyer sessions, but the equilibrium predictions were generally 
supported even with human buyers.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents Robert and Stahl’s 
(1993) model of costly advertising and search, simplified to the experimental conditions and 
parameters chosen for our laboratory implementation. It also summarizes the model’s 
comparative statics and hypotheses for the experiment, based on formal propositions and proofs 
drawn from Cason and Datta (2006). Section 3 provides details of the experimental design and 
procedures, and Section 4 contains the empirical results and discussion. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Theoretical Model 
Consider a market where n identical sellers compete to supply a homogenous product to a 
fixed number of buyers who have an identical valuation v for one unit of the good. Each seller 
produces at a constant marginal cost, which is normalized to zero, and has no fixed costs or 
capacity constraints. The sellers can inform the buyers about their price through advertising at a 
cost A. If sellers choose to advertise, they reach a fixed proportion α of the buyers.
1  
Buyers are a priori uninformed about the prices in the market but can obtain this 
information either through receiving an advertisement from sellers or by conducting search at a 
cost c per price quote. This search is without replacement and with perfect recall. Each buyer has 
an independent probability of being informed of seller j’s price. The ads are randomly distributed 
across buyers; i.e., sellers cannot target their advertising nor can the buyers influence the 
probability of receiving an advertisement.  
At the beginning of each period, all sellers choose simultaneously their price and make 
                                                 
1 This is a simplifying assumption. In the original Robert and Stahl model, sellers also choose their advertising 
intensity; i.e., the proportion of buyers that they wish to reach. Making the advertising intensity decision exogenous, 
however, has no impact on the qualitative results.   4
their binary advertising decision—whether or not to advertise this price. After advertised prices 
are conveyed to (some of the) buyers, buyers make their search decisions. Buyers who receive no 
ad must search to receive their first price quote. Buyers who receive an ad can choose to buy 
from a seller whose ad they have received or conduct costly sequential search to obtain 
additional price quotes from other sellers.  
Optimal buyer search endogenously determines a unique reservation price, r, which equates 
the marginal benefits of search to the cost of search, c. According to the reservation price 
strategy, buyers will continue search until they find a price that is less than or equal to r. Further, 
each buyer buys one unit of the good from the seller offering the lowest advertised price, pj, only 
if pj + c ≤ min{r, v}.
2, 3  
In the unique symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibrium the sellers randomize between 
advertising and not advertising. The (mixed) price strategy is given by the price distribution F(.) 
with support contained in (0, v). More specifically, the support of the distribution is the union of 
the interval [pl, r-c] and the reservation price {r}, where pl  is the lower bound of the equilibrium 
distribution.
4 Since buyers will never purchase at a price greater than their reservation price, r is 
the maximum price that the sellers will ever charge. Moreover, the distribution has a mass point 
at r since the sellers will never charge a price between r and r-c.
5 Finally, there is no mass point 
in the distribution at or below r-c since it is always profitable to break a potential tie by 
marginally decreasing the advertised price.  
The specific functional form of the equilibrium seller advertising and pricing strategy is 
summarized in the following proposition (for formal proof see Cason and Datta, 2006).  
Proposition 1: Given search cost c>0, advertising intensity α>0 and n≥2 sellers, if the 
advertising cost A is strictly less than  () ( 1 ) vcn
n
α − − , there exists a unique symmetric mixed 
strategy equilibrium such that: 
Sellers advertise ( , ) l p pr c ∈−  but do not advertise p = r; and set price according to the 
                                                 
2 This follows from the fact that a buyer who decides to buy at the advertised price will still have to incur a one-time 
transportation cost of c to procure the good from the seller.  
3 This reservation price rule holds only if there is at least one unknown price. In the case where buyers receive prices 
ads from all sellers, they purchase at the lowest advertised prices pj, as long as pj + c ≤ v. 
4 Since advertising intensity is exogenously fixed at α>0, the equilibrium outcome does not converge to Bertrand 
equilibrium as information costs go to zero. 
5 The choice of a price less than r is justified only if the seller decides to advertise the price, but given the buyer’s 
search/transportation cost c to purchase at the advertised price, this price must be at most r-c.   5
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Figure 1 illustrates the equilibrium price distributions for parameter values used in the 
experiment. It also provides a graphical presentation of the comparative statics regarding search 
and advertising costs. Formal statements of the comparative statics and other technical details are 
contained in Proposition 2 and 3 of Cason and Datta (2006) but the rationale underlying each 
comparative static prediction is detailed in the hypothesis below. 
Table 1 summarizes the parameter values used in the experiment and the theoretical 
predictions for the various treatments. The expected price refers to the overall weighted average 
of posted prices, including both advertised and unadvertised prices. Since strong quantitative 
predictions such as those shown in Table 1 rarely hold precisely in experimental studies, our 
empirical analysis will focus on the weaker, comparative static predictions summarized by the 
following hypotheses. The first three hypotheses concern the sellers’ equilibrium pricing and 
advertising behavior in response to varying levels of search and advertising cost. The last two 
hypotheses concern buyer search behavior. 
 
Hypothesis 1a: An increase in search cost results in higher prices. 
Hypothesis 1b: An increase in search cost results in increased incentives for the sellers to 
advertise, and higher seller profits. 
As search cost increases, buyer search propensity decreases. This decline in buyer search has two 
effects. One, it gives the sellers more market power, resulting in higher prices. Two, it creates an 
incentive for the sellers to inform the buyers through advertising. Since the benefit of higher 
prices may be offset by increased advertising expenditures, the impact of search cost on seller 
profit would appear to be ambiguous. However, for a wide range of parameters the price effect   6
dominates the increased advertising expenditure effect so that profit increases as c increases.  
 
Hypothesis 2a: An increase in advertising cost results in higher prices. 
Hypothesis 2b: An increase in advertising cost reduces the sellers’ propensity to advertise 
and results in higher profits. 
The direct effect of an increase in advertising cost is to reduce the seller’s incentive to advertise. 
The indirect effect of an increase in advertising cost is a shift in the cumulative price distribution 
so that sellers place a greater weight on higher prices. Higher prices combined with lower 
propensity to advertise result in increased profits.  
 
Hypothesis 3: Unadvertised prices are higher than advertised prices. 
This follows directly from the characterization of the equilibrium: sellers either charge a high 
unadvertised price or randomize in the interval of lower advertised prices. The reservation price r 
is the maximum price charged by a seller. Advertising this price will not induce the informed 
buyers to visit the seller to make a purchase, since the effective purchase price becomes r+c. 
Conversely, a seller will choose a price below r-c only if she advertises it. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Controlling for observed prices and beliefs, buyers search more frequently 
when search costs are lower. 
In the present model, a lower cost of search implicitly yields a lower reservation price r. 
Therefore, the likelihood that any given price distribution includes prices greater than r is higher 
when the search cost is low. Accordingly, buyers are more likely to search in case of low search 
cost. Laboratory studies by Schotter and Braunstein (1981) and Cason and Friedman (2003) have 
also documented the monotonic relationship between cost of search and propensity to search.    
 
Hypothesis 5: Buyers search according to an optimal search rule. 
The perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium is characterized by “no real search.” That is, in 
equilibrium, sellers do not price above the reservation price r and therefore, buyers do not find it 
optimal to search more than one seller. This result, however, is based on a number a strong 
assumptions that may not hold in practice. Differing experience is likely to encourage differing 
beliefs and behavior, which may delay or even prevent convergence to equilibrium. In particular,   7
buyers in the experiment may hold imprecise beliefs because they face an endogenous price 
distribution that is both unknown and unstable. Sellers’ pricing and advertising strategies may in 
turn be responsive to the (possibly non-equilibrium) buyer search strategy.  
Therefore, while it is plausible that human buyers follow some search rule, they may not 
strictly follow a reservation price strategy, much less an identical and unchanging reservation 
price strategy as called for in the equilibrium. Accordingly, the assessment of the optimality of 
some particular search behavior should account for the actual price draws the buyer can receive, 
and additional search should be regarded as optimal if the expected price reduction exceeds the 
cost of search. Our analysis compares the buyers’ search decisions to an optimal search rule that 
is based on an “empirical” reservation price which changes over time in response to the history 
of seller price offers.
6  
 
3. Experimental Design and Procedures 
3.1 Experimental Design 
Each market comprises 4 sellers and 5 buyers. The trading institution modifies the standard 
posted-offer environment by incorporating two treatment variables – seller advertising and buyer 
search. Sellers can reach a fixed proportion α = 0.4 of the buyers (that is, 2 of the 5 buyers) by 
incurring an advertising cost A. Buyers can obtain price quotes from sellers by engaging in 
search at a cost c per quote. The experimental design is summarized in Table 2. 
We vary advertising costs within sessions and search costs across sessions. In six of the 
markets, referred to as “High-Low-High,” sellers face a high advertising cost (A = 5) in the first 
25 periods, low advertising cost (A = 2) in the next 25 periods and high advertising cost again in 
the last 25 periods. The order is reversed for the six “Low-High-Low” markets. The two levels of 
buyer search cost used in the experiment are c =1 and c = 6. The data identify the effect of a 
change in search cost by making the relevant across-sessions comparisons while within-session 
comparisons assess the effect of change in advertising cost. 
To minimize repeated game effects and reduce the incentives for collusive behavior, we 
                                                 
6 This is only an approximation since buyers’ beliefs are not observed directly. Moreover, since our design limits the 
number of sellers in each market, consistent with the finite horizon search literature, the reservation price should be 
increasing in the number of searches. In a labor market context with a search environment similar to ours, both the 
theoretical (e.g. Gronau, 1971, and Lippman and McCall, 1976) and the experimental literature (e.g. Schotter and 
Braunstein, 1981, and Cox and Oaxaca, 1989) have concluded that “the introduction of a finite horizon leads to 
abandonment of the constant reservation wage property …[although] the qualitative implications of the model for 
changes in variables such as the direct costs of search are unchanged” (Cox and Oaxaca, 1989, pg. 306).    8
randomly re-match subjects each period. We made this design choice because we are testing a 
static model. The drawback of this design feature is that only the six pairs of the 12 markets are 
statistically independent; however, the data analysis accounts for the correlation of repeated 
observations contributed by individual subjects through random effects error specifications. 
 
3.2 Experimental Procedures 
The experiment consisted of six 2-hour sessions, each containing 18 subjects, all conducted 
in the Vernon Smith Experimental Economics Laboratory at Purdue University. A computerized 
interface using the software z-Tree was used to implement the experiment (Fischbacher, 2007). 
The subjects were recruited from undergraduate economics classes, and all were inexperienced 
in the sense that no one participated in more than one session of this type. Upon arrival, the 
subjects were seated at separate, visually isolated computer terminals and no communication was 
permitted throughout the session. Each subject received a set of instructions and record sheets, 
included as a supplementary materials Appendix on the journal web page. The instructions were 
read aloud, so we assume that the information contained in them was common knowledge.  
Each session proceeded through a sequence of 75 trading periods. All sellers had the same 
homogenous good whose cost of production was normalized to zero. The sellers did not face any 
capacity constraint. Each buyer demanded at most one unit, and received a resale value of 60 
experimental francs if they purchased this unit. At the start of a trading period, each seller posted 
a single price offer and chose whether to advertise this price. After all sellers made their pricing 
and advertising decision, some of the buyers received a price advertisement. Each advertising 
seller’s price was equally likely to be shown to each buyer and the advertisements were 
distributed randomly. Note that some buyers could receive multiple ads while others in the same 
market might not receive any ads. Buyers then made their search and purchase decisions. The 
buyers who received advertisement(s) decided whether to search for other prices or to buy a unit 
at an advertised price. If a buyer decided to search other sellers, he had to pay the transportation 
cost for each different price quote. If he decided to buy at the advertised price, he had to pay a 
one-time transportation cost to obtain the good from the seller. All transactions, costs and 
earnings were in experimental francs, which were converted to U.S. dollars at the end of the 
experiment using a known but private dollar conversion rate. The earnings typically ranged 
between $15 and $40 per subject, with an average of $25.50.   9
At the end of each period, each seller was informed about the number of units he or she 
sold, and each buyer and seller received a summary of their own current period and cumulative 
earnings. Following Cason and Friedman (2003) and Morgan, Orzen and Sefton (2006b), at the 
end of each period in four of the six sessions all buyers and sellers also learned the prices, 
quantities sold and advertising decisions of all sellers in their market. These prices were 
displayed from the lowest to the highest and did not reveal the identities of the individual 
sellers.
7 In the analysis we code these four sessions as full information sessions, and the other 
two sessions (which reported only the subjects’ private outcomes) as partial information 
sessions. The difference in information feedback led to only minor differences in results. 
 
4. Experimental Results 
We divide the results into five subsections. Section 4.1 presents an overview of the price 
and advertising data to orient the reader. Section 4.2 provides analysis of seller pricing and 
advertising behavior and section 4.3 analyses buyer search and purchase behavior. Section 4.4 
calculates the seller best-responses given the buyer search behavior and other sellers’ choices, 
and in Section 4.5 we discuss possible explanations for the observed disequilibrium behavior. 
 
4.1 Overview of Posted Prices 
  Figures 2 and 3 summarize the prices and present the most striking departures from the 
equilibrium model that we are aware of, in the experimental literature on market with incomplete 
information. Figure 2 report all individual prices in all 75 periods in one of the six sessions. 
Open circles denote advertised prices and closed squares denote unadvertised prices. The 
connected dashed and solid lines display median advertised and unadvertised prices, and the 
horizontal lines indicate equilibrium price predictions. The equilibrium predictions shift in 
periods 26 and 51 because we switched advertising cost every 25 periods. 
  Prices tend to begin above, within or below the equilibrium range for the first few trading 
periods. Without exception, however, sellers eventually post very low prices. Only the treatment 
                                                 
7 Abrams, Sefton and Yavas (2000) did not reveal to the seller the prices posted by other sellers in the market. They 
found that prices, even in the later periods, deviated significantly from the predicted level. Cason and Friedman 
(2003) on the other hand, found a much stronger support for the theoretical prediction and part of this difference in 
the results may be explained by difference in the information feedback to the sellers. Offerman, Potters and 
Sonnemans (2002) manipulate the feedback in a quantity-setting oligopoly experiment without search or advertising, 
and find that outcomes vary with the feedback in directions predicted by models of behavioral dynamics.   10
switchovers that occur every 25 trading periods reliably interrupt the downward price trends, 
although in some sessions sellers are able to increase prices within a treatment run. Figure 3 
shows the median posted prices for all sessions, with different treatments separated in different 
panels. It clearly indicates that downward price pressure is a robust, dominant feature of our data. 
Sellers ultimately post prices that are almost entirely below the lower endpoint of the equilibrium 
price interval in all sessions and all treatments. Median prices typically fall below 5 francs, 
except in the lower-right treatment that features the highest advertising and search costs. 
  Figure 2 also provides an initial impression of the “over-advertising” that we document 
formally in the next subsection. The open circles vastly outnumber the closed squares, indicating 
that sellers more often choose to advertise their prices.  
 
4.2 Seller Advertising and Pricing Behavior 
Seller Advertising Behavior. Panel A of Table 3 presents the observed frequency of advertising 
in the first 10 as well as the last 15 periods of each treatment run for different search cost-
advertising cost combinations. A comparison to the theoretical prediction reveals that the 
observed advertising rate always exceeds the model’s prediction. Equilibrium advertising rates 
range between 0.31 and 0.63 across the four treatments, while the actual advertising rates 
average between 0.53 and 0.94 when calculated over the first 10 periods of each treatment run. 
The frequency of advertising declines in later periods, but still remains well above predicted 
levels in all treatments. While aggressive advertising behavior is a prominent feature of the data, 
note that the ordering of the advertising propensity across various treatments is nevertheless 
consistent with the comparative statics predictions of the model. Advertising rates always 
increase with higher buyer search costs and decrease with higher advertising costs.   
In order to assess the statistical significance of these results we use panel data econometric 
models with a subject level random effects error specification. Panel B of Table 3 reports the 
results of probit models for the seller advertising decision. The models include 1/period to 
control for time trend. Since the time trend is more pronounced in the early periods of each run, 
we present estimates based on all 25 periods in Models 1 and 2, as well as based on the last 15 
periods of each treatment run in Models 3 and 4.
8 
                                                 
8 We also examined a variety of alternative model specifications. For example, we added an interaction term for the 
high search cost and high advertising cost dummy variables to allow for different advertising rates in each of the   11
 
Result 1: An increase in advertising cost reduces the sellers’ propensity to advertise 
(Hypothesis 2b). 
Support: Panel A of Table 3 indicates that in both search cost treatments, the advertising rate is 
always lower with higher advertising costs (0.38 to 0.70) than with lower advertising costs (0.61 
to 0.83). The probit models shown in Panel B indicate that this impact of advertising cost on 
seller advertising is significant at one-percent level in all specifications and for both all periods 
and late periods data.   
 
Result 2: An increase in search cost increases the sellers’ propensity to advertise 
(Hypothesis 1b). 
Support: As search cost increases, buyer search intensity decreases. This raises incentives for the 
sellers to inform the buyers about their prices. Panel A of Table 3 provides strong support for this 
prediction. For instance, when A =5, as search cost increases from c=1 to c=6 the late periods’ 
frequency of advertising almost doubles from 0.38 to 0.70. The regressions in Panel B provide 
statistical evidence that rejects the null hypothesis of no search cost treatment effect at any 
conventional level of significance, for different model and period specifications. In fact, a 
comparison of the advertising cost and the search cost coefficient estimates suggests that the 
indirect effect of search cost on seller advertising propensity is at least as important as the direct 
effect of advertising cost. 
Note that although the advertising rate generally exceeds the model’s prediction, the 
positive coefficient estimate on 1/period indicates that the frequency of advertising tends to 
decrease over time. This decline in advertising propensity may be related to the decline in prices, 
which is documented next. 
 
Seller Pricing Behavior. Panel A of Table 4 summarizes mean posted prices in the last 15 periods 
for different cost treatments. Observed prices are always too low compared to the theoretical 
expected price, and they are too low even compared to the theoretical minimum price. The over-
                                                                                                                                                             
four treatments. This interaction term was always statistically insignificant and including it does not change any of 
the general conclusions we draw in the reported analysis.   12
advertising documented above results in a more transparent pricing environment, which appears 
to lead sellers to price more aggressively than predicted in equilibrium.  
  
Result 3: An increase in advertising cost leads to higher prices, but only in the presence of 
high buyer search costs (Hypothesis 2a). 
Support: Panel A of Table 4 shows that as advertising cost increases from A=2 to A=5, the mean 
advertised price increases substantially when c=6 but it declines slightly when c=1. Similarly, 
although the random effect regression models (Panel B of Table 4) reject the null hypothesis that 
there is no advertising cost treatment effect, they indicate that advertising cost acts as a 
“facilitating device” to raise prices only when search costs are high. Higher advertising costs 
exert a smaller but statistically significant downward influence on prices when search costs are 
low.  
 
Result 4: An increase in search cost leads to higher prices, but only in the presence of high 
advertising costs (Hypothesis 1a). 
Support: Price averages in panel A and random effects regressions in Panel B of Table 4 indicate 
that in spite of the surprisingly low prices, the data support the comparative statics for search 
cost when advertising costs are high. Search costs do not significantly influence prices when 
advertising costs are low, perhaps because advertising is very frequent in this case (cf Table 3).  
 
Result 5: Unadvertised prices are higher than advertised prices  
Support: Analyzing the data for each search-ad cost difference separately (Panel A of Table 4), 
in all cases, except one, the average unadvertised price exceeds the average advertised price. 
Random effects models which control for time trend and sequence fixed effects also provide 
statistical evidence in favor the alternative hypothesis that advertised price is lower than the 
unadvertised price. The current period advertising decision is obviously endogenous, so we use 
an instrumental variables approach in which the actual advertising choice is replaced by the 
predicted advertising probability based on the probit models reported in Table 3. The negative 
advertising probability coefficients in models 2 and 4 of Table 4 indicate that advertised prices 
are lower than unadvertised prices. 
   13
Result 6: Prices are less dispersed than predicted, except for the treatment with low search 
and advertising costs.  
Support: The sixth column in Panel A of Table 4 summarizes the observed posted price 
dispersion. (We report the median within-period standard deviation because the mean dispersion 
is sensitive to some outliers caused by occasional non-serious price offers.) Comparing the 
observed dispersion to the equilibrium dispersion shown in Table 1 reveals that prices are less 
dispersed than predicted in 3 out of the 4 treatments. To provide a statistical comparison with the 
equilibrium dispersion, we employed a Monte Carlo simulation of 1000, 15-period price 
sequence draws from the equilibrium distribution to construct a 90-percent confidence interval 
for the price standard deviation for each treatment. Excluding the low search and advertising cost 
(A=2, c=1) treatment where price dispersion is greatest, the observed median price standard 
deviation for the later 15 periods falls below this 90-percent confidence interval in 20 of the 26 
separate treatment runs. 
 
4.3 Buyer Search Behavior  
  Panel A of Table 5 presents overall search rates by treatment for buyers who receive at 
least one ad. These rates indicate how often buyers do not buy immediately at the advertised 
price, but instead decide to search another seller. We include in this analysis only the 
nondegenerate cases in which buyers have received at least one advertised price but less than all 
four advertised prices. Panel B of Table 5 presents the rates of the first “non-trivial” search for 
buyers who receive no ad. Recall that buyers who do not receive any ad must search to get their 
first price quote, so these rates indicate how often such buyers search more than one seller.  
  Recall that in equilibrium, buyers search and purchase from only one seller because sellers 
never post prices above buyers’ reservation price. In the experiment, nearly all the posted prices 
were below the equilibrium reservation price, so according to the optimal search  strategy, the 
equilibrium search rate for all cells of Table 5 would be near zero. Out of equilibrium, imprecise 
buyer beliefs, disequilibrium price distributions that change over time, or other factors, make 
searching more attractive. Table 5 indicates that search frequency typically declines in the later 
15 periods compared to the first 10 periods as prices tend to stabilize following initial adjustment 
to the new treatment conditions. Comparing search rates across treatments, an increase in search 
costs clearly decreases the frequency of search. For example, Panel A indicates that the search   14
frequency of ad-receiving buyers more than doubles (from 9 percent to 24 percent) in the c=6 
treatment compared to the c=1 treatment in the later periods of the treatment runs. The 
corresponding increase in Panel B is also high. The impact of advertising cost on buyer search 
decisions is indirect in theory and has a smaller impact on observed search behavior.
9 
  The above documentation of search behavior does not indicate whether buyers are 
searching optimally. Previous experimental research has studied the simpler problem of 
sequential search for a price (or wage) given a fixed and known price or wage distribution (e.g., 
Schotter and Braunstein, 1981; Cox and Oaxaca, 1989; Harrison and Morgan, 1990), and 
indicates that searchers behave approximately optimally with a small bias towards stopping 
search too soon.
10 However, unlike this earlier research, buyers in our study face an unknown 
and unstable price distribution. Moreover, evaluating the optimality of buyer search is 
complicated further because the realized distribution of seller prices differs vastly from the 
equilibrium distribution. Indeed, depending on the buyers’ beliefs, a reservation price strategy 
may not even be optimal (Cox and Oaxaca, 2000). Nevertheless, we can still apply the logic of 
an optimal stopping rule for this sequential search problem to estimate whether the buyers’ 
search strategy, ex post, is approximately optimal. Our analysis strategy involves a comparison 
of the search behavior and expected returns from search to estimate whether buyers tend to over- 
or under-search given the observed prices and advertising decisions of sellers. 
First, we calculate an approximate “empirical” reservation price. Analogous to its 
equilibrium counterpart, this reservation price equates the expected benefit from search to the 
cost of search. The primary difference, however, is that in this case the conditional expectation of 
price is computed over actual price draws that a buyer could have received upon search. To 
account for the steep decline in prices typically observed in the initial periods of a treatment run, 
for the first 15 periods we base this expected value on an historical three-period moving average, 
followed by a fixed 10-period average during the final ten periods of the treatment run where 
prices are more stable. The empirical reservation price indicates whether searching an additional 
                                                 
9 A series of (unreported) random effect probit regressions formally document these observations. Controlling for a 
variety of other factors, we find that the impact of search costs on search frequency is significant at the one-percent 
level in various specifications and for both the late periods and all periods data. Moreover, we find that on the whole 
buyers respond reasonably to the potential search benefits. Buyers search with greater frequency when the lowest 
price advertisement they receive is higher, and also when they only receive one advertised price, compared to when 
they receive two or three advertised prices. 
10 Hey (1981, 1982) and Sonnemans (1998) explain this more common error of stopping search too soon by noting 
that expected losses from errors are asymmetric, with smaller losses from a higher-than-optimal reservation price.   15
seller is optimal or not, based on the actual price draws available to the buyers.  
Second, we compare actual buyer search behavior to the (approximately) optimal search 
rule. As before, we draw a distinction between a buyer who receives at least one ad and a buyer 
who receives no ads. Recall that the search cost must be paid to buy from an advertising seller, 
so for a buyer who receives ad(s) search is optimal if the (minimum) observed price plus the 
search cost is greater than the empirical reservation price. By contrast, a buyer receives no ad 
must search to receive a price quote, so the search cost becomes sunk and the decision of 
whether an additional search is optimal depends simply on whether the minimum observed price 
exceeds the empirical reservation price.  
When buyers fail to search optimally, it is useful to divide their mistakes into 2 types of 
errors: undersearch and oversearch.
11 Table 6 presents the optimal search comparisons for the 
first two search decisions made in each period.
12, 13 When c=6, shown in the lower part of the 
table, 85 to 90 percent of the search decisions are optimal. Errors that occur more commonly take 
the form of undersearch rather than oversearch. When c=1, the proportion of optimal search 
decisions is slightly lower but still quite high. Also, oversearch and undersearch rates are similar 
when c=1, in contrast to the more systematic undersearch when c=6.  
Overall, the observed search choices compared to an empirically-based optimal 
reservation price strategy indicates that the buyer search behavior is close to optimal. Consistent 
with the previous literature on sequential search, the pattern of error exhibits a bias towards 
stopping too soon (undersearch), especially with high search costs.  
 
4.4 Seller Best Responses 
In this subsection we show that the low prices posted by sellers in later periods, though 
far from the equilibrium predictions, are close to best-responses to the pricing and advertising 
decisions of other sellers and the search decisions of buyers. 
                                                 
11 Type 1 error or undersearch: Buyers did not search when they should have searched i.e., buyers did not search 
when the observed price draw (possibly inclusive of search cost) is greater than the empirical reservation price. Type 
2 error or oversearch: Buyers searched when they should not have searched i.e., buyers searched when the observed 
price draw (possibly inclusive of search cost) is less than the empirical reservation price. 
12 The first two search decisions comprise about 95 percent of decisions made by buyers in case of low search cost. 
When c=6, search propensity decreases further and therefore these computations include 99.4 percent of all buyer 
search decisions.  
13 We focus on the impact of varying levels of search cost on buyer search decision. Search costs enter buyer 
decisions directly, and as discussed earlier in this subsection, have a pronounced and predictable effect on search 
behavior. The impact of ad cost, on the other hand, is indirect since it operates through changing seller behavior.   16
To document this we calculate the sellers’ empirical best responses based on buyer search 
behavior and on 1000 simulated iid draws of three rival sellers advertising and pricing strategies. 
We select these draws from all sellers choices during the final 15 periods of each treatment, 
where prices tended to stabilize following the initial adjustment period to a new treatment 
condition. The simulation accounts for buyer search and purchase behavior by translating each 
combination of four advertising and price choices into an expected sales quantity using an 
ordered logit model, also estimated on these final 15 periods of each treatment. This generates a 
probability of selling zero through 5 units, which in turn determines the expected profits for that 
price and advertising choice.
14 In other words, we estimate the expected profitability of each 
possible price and advertising strategy by simulating 1000 rival seller strategies and a 
probabilistic model of buyer search and purchasing strategies, all based on the late periods of 
each treatment. Finally, the simulation employs a grid search over prices (at 5-cent increments) 
to identify the best strategy. 
Table 7 summarizes the best-response advertising and pricing strategy for the different 
treatments. In three out of the four treatments, the best strategy for the seller is to advertise and 
post relatively low prices.
15 It is only when A=5 and c=1 that advertising is not the best strategy 
for the seller. In this treatment due to the inexpensive search cost, on average the sellers are not 
able to recover enough of their advertising cost to make advertising worthwhile..  
The right side of Table 7 permits a comparison of the best-response advertising and 
pricing strategy with the observed seller choices. The best-response prices, ranging from 4.45 to 
8.35, are not very different from the observed average prices. Furthermore, consistent with the 
observed prices, the best-response prices calculated from these simulations are well below the 
lower bound of the equilibrium price distribution. Observed advertising rates are by far the 
lowest (38 percent) in the only treatment where advertising is not a best-response (c=1, A=5).  
 
4.5  Discussion 
The analysis in Sections 4.3 and 4.4, while admittedly ad hoc, suggests that individual 
                                                 
14 We estimated separate ordered logit models for the different number of advertised prices, and included own and 
rival prices (ordered from lowest to highest and distinguishing advertised and unadvertised prices). We also included 
an indicator dummy variable to identify high prices—those more than one standard deviation above average 
prices—because sales data indicate a substantial drop in realized sales quantity for prices well above the mean level.  
15 In all three of treatments where advertising is an optimal strategy, expected profits from advertising are 15 to 20 
percent higher than the most profitable non-advertised price   17
seller and buyer behavior does not substantially deviate from the approximate best responses. Of 
course, this behavior is not a mutual best response and so it is not an equilibrium. One large 
deviation from the equilibrium is that sellers advertise too often, so buyers are much more price 
informed than predicted. Table 8 indicates that the probability a buyer observes more than one 
price prior to purchase ranges from 8 to 27 percent in equilibrium. By contrast, the rate buyers 
actually observe more than one price before purchase is 2 to 6 times higher than the equilibrium 
rate, typically near 50 percent during the first 10 periods. This rate declines somewhat in later 
periods, but buyers still observe multiple prices far more often than in equilibrium, which 
translates into a more price elastic demand facing the individual sellers.
16 This increased price 
transparency drives seller prices below equilibrium. In the spirit of Burdett and Judd (1983) and 
Gale (1988), our results confirm that prices move towards the perfectly competitive market 
outcome as the buyer’s probability of observing more than one price increases.  
Is aggressive seller advertising, and the consequent widespread diffusion of information, 
an adequate explanation for the failure of the equilibrium price predictions? Sellers also 
advertised aggressively in our experiment that featured robot buyers (Cason and Datta, 2006). 
While sellers facing robot buyers post dispersed prices that roughly correspond to the 
equilibrium predictions of the model, the observed price levels in the present study are neither as 
high nor as dispersed as predicted by theory. Robot buyers in the earlier study were programmed 
to follow the equilibrium reservation price strategy, so they did not search if the expected price 
(inclusive of search cost) was less than the unique theoretical reservation price. The human 
buyers in the present study, on the other hand, have no reason to maintain unrealistic beliefs 
about the equilibrium price distribution and adhere to a fixed equilibrium reservation price 
strategy. They can instead update their beliefs and search strategies when they observe lower 
prices in the early periods. Therefore, although there is a slight bias towards under-search, we 
conjecture that it is buyers’ willingness to search when confronted with relatively high prices, 
combined with sellers’ propensity to over-advertise, that results in more well-informed buyers 
and such dramatically low and less dispersed prices. 
                                                 
16 As noted in footnote 9, using (unreported) probit regressions we find that buyers search with a higher propensity 
when they received only one ad as compared to when they received two or more advertised prices. This is consistent 
with a “comparison shopping” heuristic that might be followed by some buyers, as conjectured by an anonymous 
referee. The late period purchase frequencies with only one price observed (Table 8) suggest that less than half of 
the buyers could have been following this plausible rule of thumb.   18
Low prices might also arise, in part, from non-neutral risk preferences. The theoretical 
predictions are derived under the assumption of risk neutrality and the experiment does not 
control for subjects’ risk attitudes. If subjects are risk averse, as is often observed in experiments, 
prices may deviate from the risk-neutral prediction, and the direction of this deviation might 
depend on how such risk attitudes are modeled. It is well documented that risk averse buyers 
search less and tend to be less selective of price; i.e., they settle for higher prices and are willing 
to accept some prices rejected by risk neutral buyers in the same situation (Schotter and 
Braunstein,1981). Risk averse buyers could therefore lead to less price information and higher 
transaction prices. Risk averse sellers, by contrast, would tend to lower the profit margin to 
increase the likelihood of a sale compared to risk neutral sellers. This could lead to aggressive 
pricing and over-investment in advertising. Modeling the interaction of risk averse buyers and 
sellers for this market setting is a complex and open problem, and it is unclear which of these 
effects dominates theoretically. Our results suggest that the aggressive seller pricing and 
advertising behavior, which is consistent with seller risk aversion, empirically dominates the 
influence on prices.  
Finally, the differences documented between human and automated buyer treatments 
suggest additional directions for future theoretical work aimed at explaining the descriptive 
limitations of Nash equilibrium in these markets with imperfect price information. Hopkins and 
Seymour (2002) examine the dynamic stability of dispersed price equilibria in a related 
imperfect-information, price-setting environment under conditions of both seller learning and 
joint buyer-seller learning. They show that inclusion of joint buyer-seller learning dynamics rules 
out convergence to any stable price equilibria. Although their modeling framework differs from 
ours in numerous ways, Hopkins and Seymour’s results make us skeptical that it will be possible 
to identify learning dynamics that are either consistent with the observed laboratory behavior or 
converge to the perfect Bayesian equilibrium. 
 
5. Conclusion  
Economists have developed a variety of search models to help understand how costly 
information acquisition by buyers can generate dispersed price equilibria in homogeneous goods 
environments (Salop, 1973; Varian, 1980; Burdett and Judd, 1983; Stahl 1989, 1996). We test a 
simplified version of Robert and Stahl’s (1993) model that introduces seller advertising in a   19
sequential buyer search framework. This environment allows information to be both 
disseminated by the sellers and acquired by the buyers, which is more realistic than the more 
simplified, perfect information posted offer environment often studied in the laboratory.  
The experiment provides mixed support for the theoretical mixed strategy equilibrium. 
On the one hand, the model is very successful at predicting how subjects’ decisions adjust to 
changes in the underlying market environment. As seller advertising cost and buyer search cost 
change, seller prices and advertising rates change in the direction predicted by the comparative 
statics analysis. Sellers also post higher unadvertised than advertised prices, and buyers’ search 
behavior adjusts to increases in search costs as predicted. On the other hand, the data clearly 
indicate a systematic departure in the direction of more aggressive advertising and more 
competitive pricing behavior than theory predicts. Thus, although seller advertising behavior 
responds to changes in the cost of advertising and search, sellers advertise more frequently than 
predicted. Likewise, while seller pricing behavior responds to changes in the underlying 
parameters, sellers set prices that robustly approach a fairly narrow non-equilibrium range near 
the Bertrand price.  
In our previous study that employed automated, robot buyers (Cason and Datta, 2006), 
we found that despite overly-aggressive seller advertising, prices correspond closely to the 
equilibrium predictions. Adding human buyers results in observed behavior that does not 
correspond to the theoretical mixed strategy equilibrium either for advertising or pricing. In the 
unique symmetric equilibrium of the model sellers can sell at high prices and “cream skim” off 
non-searching buyers. Empirically, however, with human buyers such high prices lead to buyer 
search and no sales. Thus, while over-advertising in both studies creates an environment with 
“too much” price information, it is the human buyers’ search strategy and the manner in which it 
filters back into the sellers’ pricing and advertising behavior that leads to lower prices. These 
low, non-dispersed prices can therefore be interpreted partly a consequence of seller over-
advertising and partly a result of buyers who search when observing high prices.  
Our results therefore suggest that the delicate combination of a two-level mixed strategy 
(both in seller advertising decisions and in seller pricing) and buyer search may not be robust to 
noisy play by sellers and buyers. Modeling noisy play and bounded rationality through some 
formal framework such as the quantal response equilibrium (QRE) (McKelvey and Palfrey, 
1995, 1998) is one possibility. QRE implies that players do not always choose best responses,   20
but they are more likely to choose better responses than worse responses. This could explain, for 
example, why buyers sometimes search even when they receive ads for relatively low prices, 
instead of a sharp switch to never search after observing low prices that are below the reservation 
price level. This additional search could put downward pressure on prices. The implications of a 
noisy QRE on seller behavior are less clear, and unfortunately the direct application of a QRE 
analysis is problematic due to the continuous strategy space for sellers’ prices. If the level of 
noisy play is sufficiently great, this could result in more frequent low prices and a corresponding 
adjustment in buyer beliefs to expect (and to search for) low prices. Exploring the implications of 
QRE model to this complex market setting is an interesting topic for future research.   21
  Table 1: Summary of Parameter Values and Theoretical Predictions 
Advertising intensity (α) = 0.4 
Advertising cost A = 2 (low) and A = 5 (high) 
Search cost c = 1 (low) and c = 6 (high) 
Buyer’s valuation (v) = 60 
Number of sellers (n) = 4 


















A = 2      c = 1  [8.08, 12.37] 13.37  0.42  11.99 
(1.80) 
9.66 48.12 
A = 2      c = 6  [10.41, 20.87] 26.87  0.63  19.38 
(6.24) 
14.11 36.30 
A = 5      c = 1  [18.94, 25.79] 26.79  0.31  25.34 
(2.42) 
22.37 38.57 









    Table 2: Experimental Design 
  Seller Advertising Cost 
High-Low-High (A=5, 2, 5) 
Seller Advertising Cost 
Low- High-Low (A=2, 5, 2) 
Low Buyer Search 
Cost (c = 1 per search) 
18 subjects 
(2 randomly-regrouped markets 
of 9 subjects per market) 
36 subjects 
(4 randomly-regrouped markets 
of 9 subjects per market) 
High Buyer Search 
Cost (c = 6 per search) 
36 subjects 
(4 randomly-regrouped markets 
of 9 subjects per market) 
18 subjects 
(2 randomly-regrouped markets 
of 9 subjects per market)   22
Table 3: Frequency of Advertising and Probit Models of Seller Advertising Decision 
Panel A: Frequency of Advertising in Each Treatment Run 
[First 10 periods     Last 15 Periods   (Equilibrium Prediction)] 
 AdvertisingCost     
Search Cost  2  5  Totals   
1  0.72    0.61   (0.42)  0.53    0.38   (0.31) 0.63    0.51   
6  0.94    0.83   (0.63)  0.73    0.70   (0.52) 0.82    0.76   
Totals    0.82    0.70   0.64    0.56  0.73    0.63   
        
The first entry in each cell denotes the advertising frequency observed in the first 10 periods and the 
second entry denotes the advertising frequency observed in the last 15 periods of each treatment run. 
The third entry in parenthesis indicates the equilibrium advertising rate. 
 







late 15 periods 
Model (4) 
late 15 periods
Search Cost = 6  0.88**  0.64**  1.03**  0.71** 
dummy variable  (0.22)  (0.18)  (0.26)  (0.20) 
Advertising Cost = 5  -0.54**  -0.36**  -0.53**  -0.36** 
dummy variable  (0.05)  (0.06)  (0.07)  (0.07) 
Full end period information  0.02  -0.24  -0.15  -0.37 
dummy variable  (0.24)  (0.20)  (0.27)  (0.22) 
Last period advertising     0.93**    0.95** 
decision dummy variable    (0.08)    (0.09) 
Number of sellers that     0.13**    0.13** 
advertised previous period    (0.04)    (0.05) 
Sale made last period    -0.02    -0.06 
Dummy variable    (0.06)    (0.08) 
1/period 0.67**  1.01**  6.71**  3.15 
























Observations 3583  3441  2147  2147 
Log-likelihood -1706.69  -1473.5  -1030.1  -936.3 
Notes: Since information of the number of sellers that advertised last period is available only in the 
full information treatment, this variable is interacted with the information dummy. Standard errors 
are shown in parentheses. Models include significant treatment sequencing effects (not shown). 
** denotes significantly different from zero at 1 percent level; * denotes significantly different from 
zero at 5 percent level (all two-tailed tests).   23
Table 4: Mean Prices and Random Effects Models of Seller Pricing Decision 
Panel A: Mean prices and seller profits  in the last 15 periods 
Equilibrium 
Prediction  Observed Mean Posted Price 
Experimental 
Parameters 












A = 2      c = 1  [8.08, 12.37]  6.81  5.68  8.59  2.55  3.90 
A = 2      c = 6  [10.41, 20.87]  7.46  5.61  16.45  2.25  4.31 
A = 5      c = 1  [18.94, 25.79]  4.46  5.30  3.94  1.09  2.58 
A = 5      c = 6  [22.2, 38.69]  10.08  9.12  12.31  2.21  7.11 
 







late 15 periods 
Model (4) 
late 15 periods 
Search Cost = 6, Ad cost = 2  0.29  0.90  0.12  1.50 
dummy variable  (0.93)  (0.88)  (0.89)  (0.88) 
Search Cost = 6, Ad cost = 5  4.02**  4.36**  3.80**  4.65** 
dummy variable  (0.92)  (0.86)  (0.88)  (0.85) 
Search Cost = 1, Ad cost = 5  -0.74*  -1.31**  -2.18**  -3.01** 
dummy variable  (0.31)  (0.32)  (0.38)  (0.41) 
Full end period information  2.45**  2.17*  1.49  1.27 
dummy variable  (0.96)  (0.89)  (0.91)  (0.86) 
Predicted Adv. Probability     -2.28**    -4.63** 
(Instrumental Variable)    (0.71)    (0.88) 
Sale made last period    -1.07**    -1.46** 
Dummy variable    (0.22)    (0.28) 
1/period  15.49**  25.47**  40.10**  48.79** 




























(LR test for σu=0)  630.69**  578.16**  360.49**  309.80** 
Observations  3583  3441  2147  2147 
Log-likelihood  -11603.5  -10902.74  -6820.7  -6786.43 
Notes: 
a Posted price standard deviation shown in this column is the median of the within-period price 
standard deviation posted across sellers. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Models include 
significant treatment sequencing effects (not shown). ** denotes significantly different from zero at 1 
percent level; * denotes significantly different from zero at 5 percent level (all two-tailed tests).   24
Table 5: Buyer Search Frequencies  
Search Frequency in first 10 and last 15 Periods of Each Treatment Run 
 
Panel A: Buyers Receiving at least one Advertisement (first search decision) 
 AdvertisingCost     
Search Cost  2  5  Totals   
1  0.39    0.24   0.43    0.25        0.41    0.24   
6  0.14    0.07  0.18     0.11  0.16    0.09   
Totals  0.27    0.16  0.28     0.15  0.27    0.16   
        
Panel B: Buyers Receiving No Advertisement ( first non-trivial search decision) 
 AdvertisingCost     
Search Cost  2  5  Totals   
1  0.41    0.35        0.41    0.20        0.41    0.26   
6  0.13    0.18       0.16    0.14  0.15    0.15   
Totals  0.32    0.29       0.30    0.18  0.31    0.22   
        
The first entry in each cell denotes the search frequency observed in the first 10 periods and the 
second entry denotes the search frequency observed in the last 15 periods of each treatment run.  
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Table 6: Comparison of Buyer Search Choices to Optimal Search Rule Based on Empirical 
Reservation Price 
 
Panel A: Search Cost = 1, Buyers Receiving No Advertisement: 853/ 1046 = 81.5% of search 
decisions are optimal 
 
  Search Not Optimal  Search Is Optimal 
Did Not Search  713  28 
(17% undersearch) 





Panel B: Search Cost = 1, Buyers Receiving at least one Advertisement: 1227/1603 = 76.5% of 
search decisions are optimal 
 
  Search Not Optimal  Search Is Optimal 
Did Not Search  1060  76 
(31% undersearch) 





Panel C: Search Cost = 6, Buyers Receiving No Advertisement: 503/555 = 90.6% of search 
decisions are optimal 
 
  Search Not Optimal  Search Is Optimal 
Did Not Search  466  9 
(20% undersearch) 





Panel D: Search Cost = 6, Buyers Receiving at least one Advertisement: 1538/1757 = 87.5% of 
search decisions are optimal 
 
  Search Not Optimal  Search Is Optimal 
Did Not Search  1440  135 
(58% undersearch) 





Note: Data are displayed for the first two search decisions in each period, after excluding the 
trivial initial search decision for the case of buyers receiving no advertisement.   26
 
Table 7: Seller Best Responses and Observed Average Prices and Advertising Rates  
Empirical Best Response  Observed Averages 
Experimental 
Parameters  Advertising 






A = 2      c = 1  Advertise 4.65  0.61  5.68  8.59 
A = 2      c = 6  Advertise 4.45  0.83  5.61  16.45 
A = 5      c = 1  Not advertise  5.95  0.38  5.30  3.94 














Table 8: Frequency of observing more than one price at the time of purchase 
[First 10 periods     Last 15 Periods   (Equilibrium Prediction)] 
 Advertising  Cost   
Search Cost  2  5  Totals 
1  0.57    0.43    (0.13)        0.47    0.28     (0.08)        0.52    0.36 
6  0.51    0.46    (0.27)  0.42    0.37     (0.21)      0.46    0.41 
Totals         0.54    0.44        0.44    0.33     0.49    0.39 
      
The first entry in each cell denotes the frequency of observing more than one price in the first 10 
periods and the second entry denotes the frequency of observing more than one price in the last 
15 periods of each treatment run. The third entry in parenthesis indicates the corresponding 
frequency implied by the equilibrium advertising rate. 
   27
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Figure 3: Median posted prices in all treatment runs 
 























































































Equilibrium Range  30
Referee’s Appendix A: Experiment Instructions (not intended for publication) 
General 
 
This is an experiment in the economics of market decision-making. Various research agencies have 
provided funds for the conduct of this research. The instructions are simple and if you follow them 
carefully and make good decisions you may earn a considerable amount of money that will be paid 
to you in cash at the end of the experiment. It is in your best interest to fully understand the 
instructions, so please feel free to ask any questions at any time. It is important that you do not talk 
and discuss your information with other participants in the room until the session is over. 
In this experiment we are going to conduct markets in which you will be a participant in a sequence 
of 75 separate trading periods. In every period you will be buying or selling a fictitious good X.  All 
transactions in today’s experiment will be in experimental francs. These experimental francs will be 
converted to real US dollars at the end of the experiment at the rate of ___________ experimental 
francs = $1 in the first 25 periods and the last 25 periods, and at the rate of __________ 
experimental francs = $1 in the middle 25 periods.  Your conversion rates are your private 
information.  All buyers’ conversion rates are equal and all sellers’ conversion rates are equal, but 
the conversion rates are different for the buyers and for the sellers. Notice that the more francs you 
earn, the more dollars you earn. What you earn depends partly on your decisions and partly on the 
decisions of others. Everyone starts each set of 25 periods with a starting balance of 30 francs. 
The 18 participants in today’s experiment will be randomly re-matched each period into 2 
markets with 4 sellers and 5 buyers in each market. Therefore, the specific people who are 
trading in your market change randomly after each period. Your Personal Record sheet indicates 
whether you are a buyer or seller in today’s experiment and you will remain in this role 
throughout the experiment. 
 
Instructions to the Sellers 
 
1.  As a seller you can sell multiple units of good X every period but each buyer will purchase 
only one unit of the good each period. The good costs you nothing to produce. 
 
2.  At the beginning of every period, you decide on what price to charge per unit of good X and 
whether or not you wish to advertise this price. See Figure 1 on the next page. Click on the 
Continue button to submit your price and advertising decision. The computer will wait until 
all sellers have made their decisions before displaying anyone’s price to the market.  
 
3.  If you choose to advertise the price then you must pay an advertising cost. If you choose not   31
to advertise, you will incur no advertising cost. This advertising cost will change for each set 
of 25 periods. This change will be announced by the experimenter and the new cost will be 
displayed on your decision screen. All sellers have the same advertising cost. 
 
4.  After all sellers have made their advertising and pricing decision, some of the buyers may 
receive the price advertisement. Each seller’s advertised price will be shown to 2 buyers. 
Each buyer is equally likely to receive the ad, and which 2 of the 5 buyers actually receive 




Fig. 1  Seller’s Decision Screen 
 
5.  At the end of the period, your profit is computed and displayed on the output screen as shown 
in Figure 2. Remember that there is no cost of producing the good in this experiment. The 
only cost that you have to incur is the advertising cost if you choose to advertise the price. 
Your profit is then calculated as follows: 
 
Profit = (price × number of units sold) – advertising cost 
   32
For example:  
  Suppose a seller posts a price of 18.69 francs and chooses not to advertise. 
If the seller sells 1 unit, his profit is equal to 18.69×1 – 0 = 18.69 francs. 
  Suppose a seller posts a price of 15.60 francs and chooses to advertise when the advertising 
cost is 2 francs. 




Fig. 2  Seller’s Example Outcome Screen 
 
Instructions to the Buyers 
 
1.  Each buyer can purchase one unit of good X each period. All buyers have a resale value of 
_______ for the good. This is the amount that the buyer receives when “reselling” the item to 
the experimenter at the end of the period, as explained more in point 6 below. This value will 
remain unchanged throughout the experiment.  
 
2.  After all sellers have posted prices and made their advertising decisions, the computer 
randomly determines which seller’s prices will be displayed on which buyer’s screens at the   33
start of the buying phase of each period. That is, which price ad(s) the buyer receives is 
randomly determined and does not depend on the actions of the either buyers or the sellers. 
Note that some buyers may receive multiple ads and some may not receive any ad at all. The 
number of buyers who receive the ad depends on the number of sellers who advertise.  
For example, if one seller decides to advertise his price then two buyers will receive an ad. If 
two sellers decide to advertise, then there are 3 possibilities for the random ad distribution: 
a.  Two buyers get two ads each. 
b.  One buyer gets two ads and two other buyers get one ad each. 
c.  Four buyers get one ad each. 
 
3.  A buyer’s cost to visit a seller is ____ experimental francs. The visit cost will remain 
unchanged throughout today’s experiment. A buyer who receives an advertisement and who 
buys at an advertised price must pay this cost to visit the seller and complete the purchase. 
Buyers who receive a price ad(s) but who wish to obtain price quotes not shown in the 
advertisement must pay this cost to visit different sellers. A buyer who does not receive any 
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4.  A buyer receives a new quote from a different, randomly-determined seller each time he or 
she pays this visit cost by clicking the Visit Another Seller button on Figure 3. For example: 
a buyer who makes two visits to obtain price offers from two sellers will pay a total visit cost 
of _____ francs. If a buyer pays the visit cost to obtain a price quote from a particular seller 
in a certain period, he can purchase from that seller at any time during that same period 
without paying the visit cost again.  
 
5.  The prices are displayed on buyer’s computer screen as shown in Figure 3. The order of 
displayed prices is not related to the actual identity of the seller. The display order is 
randomly determined each period by the computer. To make the purchase, the buyer enters 
the temporary, random ID number of the seller from whom he wishes to make the purchase 
and then clicks on the Buy button. A buyer who chooses to visit another seller should click 
on the Visit Another Seller button. At any time, the buyer can choose not to purchase in the 
current period by clicking the Quit button. 
 
6.  At the end of the period, your profit is computed and displayed on an output screen similar to 
Figure 4. Remember that you will have to pay your visit cost irrespective of whether or not 
you buy the good. Your profit is then calculated as follows: 
 
Profit (if you purchase) = resale value of the good – price paid – total cost of visiting sellers 
 
Profit (if you do not purchase) = – total cost of visiting sellers 
 
Note that a buyer would earn a negative profit (lose money) if she pays a price above the 
value of the good. 
For example: Suppose the resale value of the good is 20 and the cost of visiting a seller is 1.  
A buyer receives the ad from a seller with a quoted price of 10. 
•  If he decides not to visit any other seller before buying, he earns Profit = 20 – 10 – 1= 9 
  (Note that he pays the visit cost of 1 to buy from a seller from whom he received an ad.) 
•  If he decides to visit another seller and obtains a price quote of 15, he can purchase at one 
of the two quoted prices, visit another seller or quit. 
o  If he purchases at price 10, he earns Profit = 20 – 10 – 2 = 8. 
o  If he decides to quit and not purchase, he must still pay the visit cost he just 
incurred to obtain the price quote of 15. Therefore, he earns a negative profit of –1. 
o  If he visits another seller and receives a quote of 6 and decides to purchase at this 
price, he earns Profit = 20 – 6 – 2 = 12. 
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Fig. 4  Buyer’s Example Outcome Screen 
 
End of the period 
 
1.  Once the outcome screen is displayed you should record the trading information—your price, 
quantity sold (for sellers), total revenue or resale value, advertising or visit cost—in your 
Personal Record sheet. Also record your profit from this period and from the session so far. 
Then click on the button on the lower right of your screen to begin the next trading period. 
 
2.  The top half of everyone’s outcome screen provides information for your market in the 
period just completed. All four sellers’ price offers in your market are displayed, sorted in 
random order, as well as all the sellers’ advertising decisions and quantities sold. Recall that 
you will be randomly re-matched with another group of buyers and sellers in each period. 
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